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Abstract
Cryptographic workflows are a concept with a high
potential for electronic government. It has been devel-
oped in the literature on identity based cryptography. It
allows a government as the issuer of an electronic docu-
ment to enforce the recipient to carry out certain actions
before the latter can read the document (policy enforce-
ment). The present paper models the underlying pro-
cesses by Petri nets and extracts the common features of
these cryptographic workflow nets. It shows that they
have a series of attractive properties. Further, the pa-
per focuses on the fact that the complete workflow net is
composed of a net PN1, which models the production of
the unencrypted document, and the cryptographic work-
flow net PN2. It demonstrates that desirable properties
of the Petri net PN1 are inherited by the composed net.
Hence, the incorporation of policy enforcements does
not introduce constructs that would complicate the treat-
ment of the arising Petri nets.
1. Introduction
The phrase cryptographic workflow was coined by
Al-Riyami and Paterson [6] although the underlying
idea has already been used by Paterson [16], Chen et
al. [10] and Smart [20]. Cryptographic workflows heav-
ily employ identity based cryptography (see Boneh and
Franklin [9]) or variants of it. Encryption schemes in
this type of cryptography are characterized by the appli-
cation of a user’s public key, which can be calculated di-
rectly from a string representing the user’s identity. This
contrasts favorably with classical public key encryption,
where the public key has to be extracted from a certifi-
cate issued by a certification authority in a public key
infrastructure. Let, for example, the owner of a car with
registration number X675 apply for a document, which
is issued by the government and requires the proof that
this car has been insured. In an online dialogue with the
owner, the government could establish the document and
send it to the owner in encrypted form. The government
can derive this public encryption key directly from the
identity X675. The owner as the recipient of this cipher-
text must then take care to come into possession of the
corresponding private decryption key. For this purpose,
the owner must contact the insurance company. Here
the insurance company acts as a trusted authority and
delivers this private key only, if the car with registration
number X675 is insured. In this way, the government as
the issuer of the encrypted document can enforce the re-
cipient to perform certain operations in order to achieve
the decryption of the document. This feature is called
policy enforcement. That part of the process that is en-
forced by the need to decrypt the document is named
cryptographic workflow. Obviously, this concept allows
interesting applications in electronic government.
A second example assumes a scenario of a press re-
lease, where a governmental text needs to be released
simultaneously at 12.00 on June 15. A string describing
this moment would be 1200:15:06. In this case, the
public key for the encryption of the text is directly cal-
culated from this string. Again, the government knows
the public key by simply knowing the identifier and no
public key infrastructure is necessary. The fact that the
text is encrypted enforces again certain actions by each
of the recipients, who has to wait until the trust author-
ity broadcasts the secret decryption key and then must
decrypt the ciphertext. For this purpose, it is assumed
that the trust authority is a time signal service, which
timely broadcasts the secret keys corresponding to cer-
tain time steps (every 15 minutes say). In particular this
service would broadcast the secret key corresponding to
the string 1200:15:06 exactly at twelve o’clock of
June 15. In this way it is guaranteed that each of the
recipients gets the text at the same time. Due to ap-
plications like this it is preferred to talk about identi-
fier based cryptography rather than identity based cryp-
tography. The present paper also follows this custom.
This is because the word identity implies the name of
an entity (such as a user’s email address or a car’s regis-
tration number), while many applications actually asso-
ciate keys with strings. Each string is able to represent
anything, such as legal terms and conditions, and not just
an entity’s identity. Such a string describes what con-
dition should be satisfied before the appropriate secret
key is issued by the respective trust (or authorisation)
authority. Such a secret key is often called a credential
(see Al-Riyami, Malone-Lee and Smart [5] and Barbosa
and Farshim [7]).
The present paper scans the current literature on cryp-
tographic workflows and investigates the structure of the
processes that are associated with them. For reasons
outlined e. g. by van der Aalst [1] Petri nets are cho-
sen to model these processes. Because these nets are
graphical, they are easily accessible and easy to use.
They also have a strong mathematical basis and there
are elaborate analytical techniques available for them
(see e. g. Verbeek, Basten and van der Aalst [22]). The
present paper focuses on the common features that char-
acterize Petri net representations of cryptographic work-
flows and points out that these workflow nets are nested
(one enclosed in the other) or disjoint pairs of AND-
splits/AND-joins and OR-splits/OR-joins respectively.
It can be shown that they have attractive properties such
as soundness (cf. van der Aalst and van Hee [4]).
In practice, the complete workflow net is composed
of a net PN1, which models the production of the unen-
crypted document, and the cryptographic workflow net.
The application of the suggested techniques would be
severely hindered, if the handling of the extended net is
more difficult than that of the original net. The present
paper shows that this is not the case. It investigates,
how properties of the Petri net PN1 are inherited by the
composed net. It demonstrates that for usual desirable
properties, in particular for soundness, this question can
be answered positively. The special structure of crypto-
graphic workflows allows stronger results than the gen-
eral compositionality theorems reported in the literature
(van der Aalst [3]).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sum-
marizes the basic principles of identifier based cryptog-
raphy. Section 3 gives an example for a cryptographic
workflow and extracts the common features in Petri net
representations of cryptographic workflows. In Section
4 desirable properties of these workflow nets are proven
and the inheritance of properties by the composed work-
flow net is investigated. Finally, the Conclusion inter-
prets the results and gives an outlook for potential future
work.
2. Principles of Identifier Based
Cryptography
The history of identifier based cryptography dates
back to 1984, when Shamir [19] introduced its concept
and demonstrated that the authenticity problem in public
key cryptography can be solved without the use of certi-
fication. An efficient solution for the corresponding con-
fidentiality problem was given by Boneh and Franklin
[9]. They employ the Weil pairing. There exists also
a modification based on the Tate pairing [13], which is
computationally less complex. This version will be out-
lined in the following two subsections for ease of refer-
ence (see e. g. Chen et al. [10]).
2.1. The Tate Pairing
Let G1 and G2 be two groups of prime order q in
which the discrete logarithm problem is believed to be
hard. Additionally, let t be an efficiently computable
bilinear map
t : G1 ×G1 → G2 .
The operation in G1 is written additively, since in ap-
plications G1 will be the group of points on an elliptic
curve. The group G2 will denote a subgroup of the mul-
tiplicative group of a finite field and is written with a
multiplicative notation. Consequently,
t(P1 + P2, Q) = t(P1, Q) · t(P2, Q) ,
t(λP,Q) = t(P,Q)λ ,
t(P,Q1 +Q2) = t(P,Q1) · t(P,Q2) ,
t(P, µQ) = t(P,Q)µ
for all P,Q, P1, P2, Q1, Q2 ∈ G1 and λ, µ ∈ Zq . The
bilinearity of the map t allows a series of useful tricks.
For example for P,Q ∈ G1 and κ, λ, µ ∈ Zq we have
t(κP, λQ)µ = t(κP, µQ)λ = t(λP, µQ)κ
= t(λP, κQ)µ = t(µP, κQ)λ
= t(κλP,Q)µ = t(κλP, µQ)
= t(P, κλQ)µ = t(µP, κλQ)
= . . .
= t(κλµP,Q) = t(P, κλµQ)
= t(P,Q)κλµ .
Further, two cryptographic hash functions are de-
fined:
H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 ,
H2 : G2 → {0, 1}∗ .
2.2. Identifier Based Encryption
There is some trust authority (TA), which owns a
public/private key pair. This is a pair (RTA, s) where
RTA ∈ G1 and s ∈ Zq with
RTA = sP
for some given fixed point P ∈ G1 . The private (secret)
key s of the trust authority is often called the ‘master
key’. An identifier based key pair is a pair (QID, SID)
whereQID, SID ∈ G1 and the master key and the iden-
tifier based key pair are linked by
SID = sQID and QID = H1(ID) .
Here, ID is the identifier string. The (identifier based)
public key QID can be directly derived from the identi-
fier. It should be clearly distinguished between the pri-
vate key s of the TA (the master key) and the identifier
based private key SID . Please note that SID can be
generated only by the TA. For this reason, the TA is of-
ten (see e. g. [6]) called private key generator (PKG).
As usual in public key cryptography the sender en-
crypts a message by the public key of the addressee. Let
the string m ∈ {0, 1}∗ be the message to be encrypted.
Then the identifier based encryption scheme of Boneh
and Franklin [9] works as follows:
- Encryption:
Compute U = rP where r is a random element of
Zq . Then compute
V = m⊕H2(t(RTA, rQID)) ,
where ⊕ denotes the bitwise addition modulo
2 (equivalent to the XOR-operation). The pair
(U, V ) is the ciphertext.
- Decryption:
Decryption is performed by computing
V ⊕H2(t(U, SID))
= V ⊕H2(t(rP, sQID))
= V ⊕H2(t(P,QID)rs)
= V ⊕H2(t(sP, rQID))
= V ⊕H2(t(RTA, rQID))
= m.
Clearly, it has to be assumed that the recipient of
the ciphertext owns the identifier based secret key SID.
Please note that the TA can always decrypt, too. This
is the so called key escrow property. In some appli-
cations, such as disaster recovery, this escrow facility
may be useful. However, for many applications this
escrow property is undesirable and more sophisticated
techniques have to be used (see Subsection 3.3).
3. Cryptographic Workflows
3.1. An Example
In this subsection a (slightly modified) example of
Chen at al. [10] for a cryptographic workflow is pre-
sented in order to give an introduction into the basic
concept. For details the reader is referred to this pa-
per. The example extends the approach of Subsection
2.2 as it assumes that there are not only one but two trust
authorities each with their own public/private key pair.
It describes a possible online car tax disk dispenser in
the United Kingdom. In this country every car needs
to display a tax disk. This is purchased each year for a
nominal fee, and essentially proves that at a given point
in the year the owner of the car had car insurance and a
certificate of road worthiness for the car. Obviously, two
trust authorities are required:
- The insurance certificate is produced by an insur-
ance company, say AXA.
- The certificate of road worthiness is produced by
an accredited garage, say Joes Garage.
In reality, also the ownership of the car has to be
recorded by the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency.
However, this feature is suppressed here for ease of pre-
sentation.
The public/private key pairs for the two trust authori-
ties are denoted by
(RAXA, sAXA) , (RJoes, sJoes)
with
RAXA = sAXAP, RJoes = sJoesP .
Suppose the owner of the car with registration number
X675 wished to obtain a new tax disk from the gov-
ernment. They could then log into some web site and
claim that they had insured it through AXA and that
Joes Garage had issued them with a certificate of road
worthiness. The government could then email the user
an encrypted version of the tax disc, upon payment of
some fee, where the encryption is under the virtual trust
authorityRAXA+RJoes , and the identifier based pub-
lic key is
QX675 = H1(X675) .
Consequently, during the encryption of the tax disc m
the ciphertext (U, V ) is computed with U = rP where
r is a random element of Zq and
V = m⊕H2 (t (RAXA +RJoes, rQX675)) .
The fact that the tax disc is encrypted enforces certain
actions by the owner, who would need to obtain from
each trust authority the corresponding (identifier based)
private key
SX675,AXA and SX675,Joes respectively
with
SX675,AXA = sAXAQX675 ,
and
SX675,Joes = sJoesQX675 .
Each trust authority delivers the private key only if the
corresponding condition (insurance and road worthiness
respectively) is satisfied. The owner now adds these pri-
vate keys together to form a virtual private key, which
allows the decryption of the electronic form of the tax
disk by computing
V ⊕ H2
(
t
(
U, SX675,AXA + SX675,Joes
))
=
V ⊕ H2 (t (rP, (sAXA + sJoes)QX675)) =
V ⊕ H2 (t ((sAXA + sJoes)P, rQX675)) =
V ⊕ H2 (t (RAXA +RJoes, rQX675)) = m.
Please note that in the example a traditional public
key infrastructure is not necessary because the identifier
based public key can be derived directly from the corre-
sponding identifier.
3.2. Petri Net Representation
Workflows can advantageously be represented by
Petri nets (see e. g. van der Aalst [1]). This subsection
gives the Petri net for the example of Subsection 3.1. It
thus illuminates the subprocess that is enforced by the
use of identifier based cryptography. For the Petri net
terminology the reader is referred to the book of van der
Aalst and van Hee [4] and to van der Aalst [3]. Figures 1
and 2 present the Petri net for the example of Subsection
3.1.
The complete workflow net is composed of the nets
PN1 and PN2. In the net PN1 the government first
produces the (unencrypted) document. This process is
not specified in detail. The transition t+ represents the
task government sends document to user. The workflow
net PN1 alone can be viewed as an idealized situation
where the user can be trusted totally and the government
has no need to control the user. In the complete work-
flow the transition t+ in PN1 is refined by the workflow
net PN2 of Figure 2, i. e. t+ is no longer a task but a
reference to a subflow. The semantics of this hierarchi-
cal concept are straightforward; simply replace the re-
fined transition t+ by the corresponding subnet from the
Figure 1. Workflow netPN1 for the example
of Subsection 3.1
transition government encrypts document to the transi-
tion user adds keys together and decrypts the encrypted
document. The subnet from the AND-split user con-
tacts AXA and Joes Garage to the corresponding AND-
join represents the cryptographic workflow. This part
of the process is enforced by the use of identifier based
cryptography. There are also two pairs of OR-splits/OR-
joins. If the result of the checks are positive, the trust au-
thorities AXA and Joes Garage send the correct (identi-
fier based) private keys SX675,AXA and SX675,Joe
respectively. Otherwise they send useless dummy keys.
Only if the user has stored both correct private keys, the
decryption in the final AND-join will produce the cor-
rect unencrypted document.
Please note that the token has to carry a lot of in-
formation (for example the ciphertext). Hence, the nets
PN1 and PN2 should be interpreted as colored Petri
nets (see Jensen [14]).
3.3. Common Features of Cryptographic Work-
flows
The cryptographic workflow of Figure 2 is character-
ized by the fact that the user has to contact the two trust
Figure 2. Workflow net PN2 for the example of Subsection 3.1
authorities AXA and Joes Garage to get the private keys
SX675,AXA and SX675,Joes .
Consequently, the enforced policy of this cryptographic
workflow is defined by a logical conjunction. This is re-
flected in the AND-split/AND-join pair in Figure 2. In
this example, the identifier X675 is the same for both
keys. In a more general setting, there are n (possi-
bly) different trust authorities TAi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) with
public/private key pairs (RTAi , sTAi) with
RTAi = sTAiP .
There are also n (possibly) different identifiers IDi
with respect to the corresponding trust authorities TAi .
So, the identifier based key pairs (QIDi , SIDi,TAi) are
linked via
SIDi,TAi = sTAiQIDi and QIDi = H1(IDi) .
In this case, the message m is encrypted by the compu-
tations U = rP and
V = m⊕H2
(
n∏
i=1
t(RTAi , rQIDi)
)
.
Decryption is performed by computing
m = V ⊕H2
(
t(U,
n∑
i=1
SIDi,TAi)
)
.
These equations generalize the corresponding relations
in Subsection 2.2. For details the reader is referred to
Chen et al. [10], Paterson [16] and [17]. The enforced
policy is defined by a logical conjunction
∧n
i=1 .
This approach is more efficient than the trivial tech-
nique that uses the following onion form of encryption
where each encryption is applied in turn to obtain the
ciphertext. Let us assume that the producer of the (un-
encrypted) document m wants to force the addressee to
demonstrate the knowledge of the identifier based pri-
vate keys Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn . Let yi denote the proposition
“recipient knows Yi”. Then, the policy enforcement can
be described by the boolean formula
y1 ∧ y2 ∧ . . . ∧ yn (conjunction) .
If X1, X2, . . . , Xn are the corresponding public keys,
the producer would send
EX1 (EX2 (. . . EXn(m) . . .))
to the addressee. Here, EK(m) denotes the encryption
of m under the key K. Similarly, the policy
y1 ∨ y2 ∨ . . . ∨ yn (disjunction)
can be enforced by sending the set
{EX1(m), EX2(m), . . . , EXn(m)} .
Hence, in both cases n applications of the encryption
operation are necessary. In the case of disjunction a
large increase in message size occurs. Also more gen-
eral boolean functions consisting of conjunctions and
disjunctions are possible. Let, for example, the policy
enforcement be described by the logical formula
x ∨ (y ∧ z) . (1)
In this case the producer would send
{EX(m), EY (EZ(m))} ,
where X , Y and Z are the corresponding public keys.
Clearly, one can never show not to know a given key.
Hence, the logical formulae used can never contain the
logical negation. For the most general case (combina-
tion of conjunctions and disjunctions), Smart [20] has
presented solutions within the frame of identifier based
encryption that are much more efficient than the trivial
techniques described above, in particular with respect to
bandwidth.
Key escrow is an inherent property of identifier based
encryption as pointed out in Subsection 2.2. For this
reason Al-Riyami and Paterson [6] present a protocol,
which modifies the scheme of Boneh and Franklin [9]
and avoids the problem of key escrow. This method,
called certificateless public key cryptography, requires
each user to have a (possibly unauthenticated) public
key. Messages are then encrypted using a combination
of a user’s public key and its identifier based key. The
system of Al-Riyami, Malone-Lee and Smart [5] uses
a similar idea and employs secret sharing based mono-
tone access structures such as that by Shamir [18] (in
the case of threshold schemes) or Benaloh and Leichter
[8] (in the case of general access structures). A mono-
tone access structures can always be described by the ap-
propriate disjunctive normal form boolean formula (see
e. g. Stinson [21]). So, again the policy enforcements are
defined by boolean formulas consisting of conjunctions
and disjunctions. An analogous comment applies to the
work of Barbosa and Farshim [7].
The above investigations show that all cryptographic
workflows in current literature realize a policy enforce-
ment that can be described by an underlying boolean for-
mula, which is a combination of conjunctions and dis-
junctions. Consequently, in the most general case the
Petri net descriptions of these workflows are built of a
sequence construct and of pairs of AND-splits/AND-
joins and OR-splits/OR-joins respectively. In the gen-
eral case, the AND-split/AND-join pair in Figure 2
(simple conjunction) must be substituted by nested
(one enclosed in the other) or disjoint pairs of AND-
splits/AND-joins and OR-splits/OR-joins respectively.
A typical situation is depicted in Figure 3. It corresponds
to the logical formula of Equation (1). These observa-
Figure 3. A typical cryptographic workflow
net, cf. Equation (1)
tions motivate the following definition.
Definition 1 A cryptographic workflow net is a work-
flow net that consists of (in this order)
a) a source place i ,
b) a sequence construct,
c) nested (one enclosed in the other) or disjoint pairs
of AND-splits/AND-joins and OR-splits/OR-joins
respectively,
d) a sink place o .
Workflow nets are special cases of classic Petri nets
(see e. g. van der Aalst and van Hee [4]). Part c) of the
definition represents the cryptographic workflow itself,
i. e. that part of the process that is enforced by the policy
via identifier based cryptography.
4. Inheritance
Cryptographic workflows nets have many desirable
properties that are given in the next theorem. Please note
that for the application of the Petri net terminology the
OR-splits and OR-joins have to be substituted by their
explicit or implicit Petri net representations (cf. [4]). For
the concept of free choice Petri nets the reader is re-
ferred to the book of Desel and Esparza [12]. The pair
(PNcw, i) denotes the system that consists of the Petri
net PN1 and the initial marking i .
Theorem 1 Let PNcw be a cryptographic workflow net
according to Definition 1. Then it is a) free choice, b)
well-structured, c) S-coverable; d) (PNcw, i) is safe; e)
PNcw is sound.
Proof. Throughout the proof, PNcw denotes the short-
circuited net of PNcw.
a) If two transitions of PNcw have a common in-
put place, then both transitions have no other input
places.
b) The short-circuited net PNcw is well-handled. In-
deed, let x and y be a pair of nodes of this net
such that one is a place and the other a transition.
Then by definition there cannot exist two disjoint
elementary paths leading from x to y in PNcw.
c) For any node of the short-circuited net PNcw there
exists an S-component, which contains this node.
d) The net PNcw with the initial marking i contains
one token in the place i. Clearly, for each place the
number of tokens never exceeds one.
e) Because of d) and Theorem 11 of van der Aalst
[2] it is sufficient to demonstrate the liveness of
(PNcw, i): Indeed, for every reachable marking
M ′ and every transition t there is a marking M ′′
reachable from M ′ that enables t. ¤
The complete workflow net is composed of the work-
flow net PN1 of Figure 1 and a cryptographic workflow
net (e. g. that of Figure 2 or Figure 3). Here, the task
t+ in PN1 is refined by the cryptographic workflow net,
i. e. the transition t+ is replaced by the corresponding
subnet. The precise semantics of this hierarchy concept
are given in the following definition (cf. van der Aalst
[3]).
Definition 2 (Compositionality) Let PN1 =
(P1, T1, F1) be the workflow net of Figure 1 and
let PN2 = (P2, T2, F2) be a cryptographic workflow
net with T1 ∩ T2 = ∅ and P1 ∩ P2 = {i, o}. The
composed workflow net PN3 = (P3, T3, F3) is ob-
tained by replacing transition t+ in PN1 by PN2,
i. e. P3 = P1 ∪ P2, T3 = (T1 \ {t+}) ∪ T2 and
F3 ={
(x, y) ∈ F1 | x 6= t+ ∧ y 6= t+
} ∪
{(x, y) ∈ F2 | {x, y} ∩ {i, o} = ∅} ∪{
(x, y) ∈ P1 × T2 | (x, t+) ∈ F1 ∧ (i, y) ∈ F2
} ∪{
(x, y) ∈ T2 × P1 | (t+, y) ∈ F1 ∧ (x, o) ∈ F2
}
.
In the situation characterized by this definition the
question arises how properties of the workflow net PN1
are inherited by the complete workflow net PN3 . Theo-
rem 3 of [3] gives partial answers to this question. How-
ever, the special structure of the workflow nets in the
present paper allows stronger results in the following
theorem. Please note that the properties of the work-
flow net PN1 of Figure 1 are determined mainly by the
properties of the subprocess production of (unencrypted)
document.
Theorem 2 (Inheritance) Let PN1 = (P1, T1, F1)
be the workflow net of Figure 1 and let PN2 =
(P2, T2, F2) be a cryptographic workflow net. Further,
let PN3 = (P3, T3, F3) be the composed workflow net
according to Definition 2. Then the following statements
hold:
a) If PN1 is free choice, then PN3 is free choice.
b) If PN1 is well-structured, then PN3 is well-
structured.
c) If PN1 is S-coverable, then PN3 is S-coverable.
d) If (PN1, i) is safe, then (PN3, i) is safe.
e) If PN1 is sound, then PN3 is sound.
Proof.
a) The net PN1 is free choice by assumption; PN2
is free choice because of Theorem 1. Further, there
does not exist a pair of transitions (t1, t2) ∈ T3×T3
with a common input place and with one transitioin
in T3 ∩ (T1 \ {t+}) and the other in T3 ∩ T2 . Con-
sequently, PN3 is free choice.
b) Let x and y be a pair of nodes of PN3 such that one
is a place and the other a transition. Because PN1
and PN2 are both well-structured (for the latter cf.
Theorem 1), there cannot exist two disjoint elemen-
tary paths leading from x to y in the short-circuited
net PN3, if x and y are both in (P3 ∪ T3) ∩ (P1 ∪
(T1 \ {t+})) or both in (P3 ∪ T3)∩ (P2 ∪ T2) . So,
let x be in (P3 ∪ T3) ∩ (P1 ∪ (T1 \ {t+})) and y
be in (P3 ∪ T3) ∩ (P2 ∪ T2) . Two paths from x to
y must then have the node document ready in com-
mon. Similarly, if x is in (P3 ∪ T3) ∩ (P2 ∪ T2)
and y is in (P3 ∪ T3) ∩ (P1 ∪ (T1 \ {t+})), two
paths from x to y must then have the short-circuit
in common. So, in both cases the two paths are not
disjoint and PN3 is proven to be well-structured.
c) Each S-component of the short-circuited net PN1
can be combined with an S-component of PN2 (cf.
Theorem 1) to an S-component of PN3 .
d) Because (PN1, i) is safe, the number of tokens
of (PN3, i) does not exceed 1 for each place in
P3 ∩ P1 . In particular, this is valid for the place
document ready. Because of Theorem 1, (PN2, i)
is safe, too. Consequently, for each place in P3∩P2
the number of tokens does not exceed 1, either.
e) The soundness of PN1 guarantees that for all
markings reachable from state i the place o will
never contain more than one token. Consequently,
the place document ready must be safe. This is the
only input place of t+. The rest follows from the
soundness of PN2 (Theorem 1) and from the proof
of 3. of Theorem 3 in [3]. ¤
5. Conclusion
The examples in the introduction make clear that pol-
icy enforcement via identifier based cryptography (or its
variants) is an attractive tool for electronic government.
The corresponding processes can be modeled concisely
by Petri nets. The present paper shows that the Petri
nets associated with policy enforcements (called cryp-
tographic workflow nets) have attractive features. The
most important among these properties is soundness.
Roughly speaking, a process, which is modeled by a
sound workflow net, fulfills three requirements: (1) For
every state reachable from the source place i it is pos-
sible - by performing a number of tasks - to come to a
state in which there is a token in the sink place o; (2)
when there is a token in this sink place o, all other to-
kens have disappeared; (3) there are no dead tasks, i. e. it
is possible to execute an arbitrary task by following the
appropriate route through the workflow net. These prop-
erties ensure that every case that begins at the place iwill
eventually be completed properly. Soundness is a strong
indication that the workflow net is correctly established.
Further, the present paper demonstrates important in-
heritance properties: Let a government enforce certain
actions of a citizen via the techniques of identity based
cryptography. Then, on the modeling level so called pol-
icy enforcements are incorporated into an original work-
flow net. The results of Section 4 show that the extended
net receives all the standard attractive features, that are
present in the original net. In particular the extended
net will have the free choice and the well structuredness
properties, if these are valid for the original net. Con-
sequently, in these nets it can be decided in polynomial
time whether they are sound or not. If the original net is
already known to be sound, the same can be guaranteed
for the extended net. In other words, the employment
of cryptographic workflows preserves desirable proper-
ties. So, from a modeling perspective the incorporation
of policy enforcements does not produce any compli-
cations. This attractive feature stimulates the applica-
tion of the suggested techniques and promotes the use
of Petri nets in the practice of electronic government.
As a next step in future work the techniques of iden-
tity based cryptography have to be made accessible in
Petri net based commercial workflow management sys-
tems like COSA [11]. On the academic level this has
been done in the work of Wu¨nschmann [23] for CPN
Tools [15], a computer tool for constructing and ana-
lyzing colored Petri nets. Here Wu¨nschmann makes
use of the CPN ML library Comms/CPN, which enables
CPN Tools to communicate with external applications
and processes on the basis of the TCP/IP protocol.
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